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Abstract
Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have
recently developed formal signaling mechanisms. We show that such mechanisms are
harmful for some environments. While signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In
particular, we consider a two-sided matching game of incomplete information between
…rms and workers. Each worker has either the same "typical" known preferences with
probability close to one or "atypical" idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary
probability close to zero. Firms have known preferences over workers. We show that if
at least three …rms are responsive to some worker’s signal, the introduction of signaling
strictly decreases the expected number of matches.
JEL classi…cation: C72, C78, D80, J44.
Key words: signaling, cheap talk, matching.
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Introduction

In December 2006, the Ad Hoc Committee of American Economic Association implemented
signaling as an actual instrument to facilitate match formation in the job market for new
Ph.D. economists. Using this service, Ph.D. candidates have an opportunity to send signals
to up to two departments to indicate their interest. The introduction of signals is supported
by Roth (2008) and Coles et al. (2010b) who suggest that a limited number of signals can
credibly transmit information about candidates’preference, which could help to reduce the
coordination failures faced by the market participants and facilitate better match formation.1
In addition to the job market for new Ph.D. economists, some versions of signaling
mechanisms have emerged in other markets. For example, Skydeck360, a student-operated
company at Harvard, o¤ers a signaling service for MBA students in their search for internships and full-time jobs. Each registered student can send up to ten signals to employers
via their secure website.2 Early college admission in the U.S. can also be viewed as a form
of signaling. Many schools require that applicants send early applications to one school and
view an early application as a signal of a student’s enthusiasm for a particular school.3
To study signaling in matching markets, we consider one-to-one decentralized matching
model between …rms and workers without transfers similar to the one of Coles et al. (2010b).4
Each agent (…rm or worker) knows its own preferences over agents on the other side of the
market, but is uncertain about the preferences of other agents. Each worker has either the
same “typical” commonly known preferences with a probability close to one or “atypical”
preferences taken from some distribution with the complementary probability close to zero.5
The preferences of workers are ex-ante independently distributed. Firms have some …xed
and commonly known preferences over workers that need not to be the same.
We consider a decentralized matching game with three stages. First, agents’preferences
are realized and each worker chooses a …rm, to which she sends one private costless signal.
Each signal is a …xed message; that is, the only decision of workers is whether and to whom
to send a signal. No decision can be made about the content of the signal. Signals are sent
simultaneously, and are observed only by …rms who have received them. Second, …rms make
decisions about job o¤ers by taking into account signals received. Each …rm can make only
1

For more discussion see “Signaling for Interviews in the Economics Job Market”AEA (2005), a document
created by the Ad Hoc Committee to provide advice to participants in the job market for new Ph.D.
economists.
2
See http://skydeck360.posterous.com for details.
3
See Avery and Levin (2009) for the analysis of match formation in the U.S. college admission market.
For additional examples of markets that employ signaling mechanisms see Coles et al. (2010b).
4
Our model di¤ers from Coles et al. (2010b) only in the assumption on the distribution of agent preferences.
5
We assume that typical workers rank …rms according to some public ranking. For example, typical
candidates in the job market for new Ph.D. economists rank departments of economics in their …eld according
to the U.S. News and World Report ranking.
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one o¤er. Finally, each worker chooses one o¤er to accept from among the available ones.
We show that signals induce information asymmetry among …rms. This leads to coordination failure at the o¤er stage and decrease in the expected number of matches. In particular,
if at least three …rms respond to some worker’s signal in our environment, i.e. treat signals informatively, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of
matches.
The overall e¤ect on …rm and worker welfare due to the introduction of a signaling
mechanism is ambiguous. On the one hand, signals help to secure “better”matches between
some workers and …rms, which positively a¤ects the welfare of agents on both sides of the
market. On the other hand, the introduction of signals leaves some workers and …rms
unmatched, which negatively a¤ects the welfare of agents on both sides of the market.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, this paper shows that the signaling
mechanism that has been implemented in some real-life markets impedes match formation in
some environments. Second, this paper contributes to the cheap talk literature (see Crawford
and Sobel, 1982) by exemplifying an environment in which new cheap talk equilibria may be
welfare inferior compared to babbling equilibria.6 To the best of our knowledge, only Farrell
and Gibbons (1989) have results that new cheap talk equilibria can be welfare inferior to
babbling equilibria. They consider costless communication with limited type space in twoagent bargaining model. Since there is no coordination problem in their two-agent problem,
their intuition di¤ers from ours.7
We want to note here that we do not aim to capture the most realistic environment with
the above model. We rather want to show our main point that the introduction signals
can be harmful for some matching markets. We discuss the robustness of our results to
the introduction of additional periods of interaction between …rms and workers, additional
signals, as well as public signals in the conclusion.
Our results are complementary to Coles et al. (2010b) who show that signaling is bene…cial
for matching markets in which agents have disperse distribution of preferences. They show
that the introduction of signaling increases both the expected number of matches and the
expected welfare of workers in their environment. Parendo (2010) also analyzes a complete
information version of this model with workers being indi¤erent among …rms and …rms have
perfectly aligned preferences. On empirical side, Coles et al. (2010a) provide suggestive
evidence regarding the job market for new Ph.D. economists. They show that, on average,
sending a signal of interest increases the chances of receiving an interview from an economics
department.8
6

Note that signaling that we analyze in this paper is a form of costless communication, or cheap talk.
There is no penalty attached for lying, and claims do not directly a¤ect payo¤s.
7
We are thankful for Lones Smith who drew our attention to this comparison.
8
The economic departments conduct most of their interviews during the annual Allied Social Science
Associations meeting in January.
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The current paper is also related to the study of preference signaling in centralized matching markets. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2008) show that the introduction of a signaling mechanism can improve the ex-ante e¢ ciency of the deferred acceptance algorithm (see Gale
and Shapley, 1962) in presence of indi¤erences. Lee and Schwarz (2007) analyze preferences signaling in centralized matching markets in a three step matching formation process:
preference signaling, investments in information acquisition, and the formation of matches
based on available information. They show that agents reveal their preference truthfully in
equilibrium under some assumptions on agent utilities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our general model and introduces
some notation. Equilibrium analysis is presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present
the comparison of the expected number of matches and agent welfare between the model
with and without signals. Section 6 compares these implications with the results in the
previous literature and discusses two controversial roles of signals in matching markets.
Finally, Section 7 discusses some extensions and concludes. All proofs are postponed to the
Appendix.

2

Model

We consider a two-sided matching market with workers and …rms: The set of workers and
the set of …rms are denoted as W and F respectively with jWj=W and jFj=F . We assume
that W F .
Each worker can …ll at most one position, and each …rm has the capacity to hire at most
one worker. Worker w ranks …rms according to some strict preference list w ; and w denotes
the set of possible worker’s preference lists. We use the convention that the …rm of rank one
is the most preferred …rm, while the …rm of rank F is the least preferred …rm. The set of all
workers’preference pro…les is denoted as W = ( w )W . Similarly, we de…ne f , f and F
for …rms.
Each agent a has cardinal utility compatible with preference list a . For simplicity of the
exposition, we assume that …rms and workers have the same utility function. In addition,
utility depends only on the rank of the matching partner. Speci…cally, the utility of an …rm
(worker) from being matched with a worker (…rm) on the kth position in her/its preference
list equals u(k). An agent’s cardinal utility from being unmatched is normalized to zero. We
also assume that there is no worker whom …rms do not want to hire, and there is no worker
who prefers being unemployed to being matched with some …rm, i.e. for any k; u(k) > 0.
Each …rm f has some …xed publicly known preference list f . Firms’preferences need not
to be the same. Each worker can be one of two types: “typical”or “atypical”. All workers of
typical type have the same commonly known preference list 0 . The preferences of atypical
workers are identically and independently distributed according to some distribution A( w )
4
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with full support, i.e. each possible worker preference pro…le has a positive probability
of realization. Each worker is ex-ante typical with probability 1 " and atypical with
complementary probability "; for some " 2 (0; 1). Our main analysis considers the case when
" is small.
For convenience, we name …rms according to the typical preference list of workers 0 =
(f1 ; :::; fF ); i.e. f1 is the best …rm, f2 is the second best, etc. We also impose a convenient
notation for workers: worker w1 is the best worker among all workers W according to …rm f1 ’s
preferences, and for each i = 2; :::; F worker wi is the best worker among Wn fw1 ; :::; wi 1 g
according to …rm fi ’s preferences. The rest of the workers, Wnfw1 ; :::; wF g; are named
according to some prespeci…ed order.9
We analyze two settings. The …rst one, the game without signals, consists of two stages.
First, agents’preferences are realized, and each …rm can make up to one o¤er to some worker.
Second, workers choose an o¤er to accept among available ones.
In the second setting, the game with signals, before o¤ers are made, each worker has
the opportunity to send one private costless signal to a …rm, which may use this signal to
partially infer worker preferences. Each signal is a …xed message; that is, the only decision
of workers is whether and to whom to send a signal. No decision can be made about the
content of the signal. Signals are sent simultaneously, and are observed only by …rms who
have received them.
Note that sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best available
o¤er at the last stage of the both games. Hence, we take this workers’behavior at the last
stage as given and focus on the reduced games with one and two stages respectively.
We now describe agents’strategies and the equilibrium concept for the game with signals.
The corresponding notions for the game without signals can be adapted accordingly. In the
game with signals, a strategy of a worker w (at the …rst stage) is a map from the set of all
possible preference lists to the union of the set of …rms and no-…rm option, denoted by N ;
w :
w ! F [ N . A strategy of …rm f (at the second stage) is a map from the set of all
possible combinations of received signals, 2W , which is the set of all subsets of workers, to the
union of workers and the no-worker option. That is, f : 2W ! W [ N ; where with some
abuse of notation we denote N of being no-worker option: The dependence of …rm strategy
on preferences is omitted, because we assume that each …rm has some …xed publicly known
preferences. We denote a pro…le of all workers’strategies as W = ( w1 ; ::: wW ), and the set
of worker’s strategies as w . Similar we de…ne F and f :
For a given strategy pro…le of agents = ( w ; f ) and realized agent types 2 F
W
one can determine the …nal matching and agents’utilities. We denote the utility of agent a
given a strategy pro…le and a pro…le of types as a ( ; ):The interim expected payo¤ of
9

This notation implies that if all …rms had the same preferences
to this preference list
= fw1 ; :::; wW g.

, workers would be named according
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worker w with preferences w from strategy w when the other agents follow a strategy pro…le
P
t( w ) w (( w ; w ); ( w ; w )); where t( w ) denotes
w equals uw ( w j
w; w) =
w
the joint distribution of all agents except worker w preferences.
Note that signals are private and a …rm does not observe a worker’s action unless it
receives a signal from the worker. Hence, the game with signals is the game of incomplete information and unobserved actions (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). For each
possible set of received signals, WfS ; …rm f forms beliefs about the distribution of both
workers’ types and actions. Namely, f ( ; W S f jWfS ) speci…es the probability …rm f assigns to outcome ( ; fWfS gf 2F ) conditional on receiving signals from set WfS of workers.
The interim expected payo¤ of …rm f given a subset of received signals WfS
W, beS
S
liefs f ( jWf ); and other agents’ strategy pro…le
f is given by uf ( f j
f ; Wf ; f ) =
P P
S
S
f ; ): To conduct our formal analysis we use the
W Sf 2(2W )F 1 f ( ; W f jWf ) f ( f ;
notion of sequential equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A strategy pro…le (^ w ; ^ f ) and …rm beliefs f^ f gf 2F form a sequential equilibrium if
for any w 2 W;

w

for any f 2 F; WfS

2

W

: ^w(

w)

2 arg max

W : ^ f (WfS ) 2 arg max

w2

w

uw (

w j^ w ; w )

and

f2

f

uf (

S
f j^ f ; Wf ;

^ f );

where beliefs are de…ned using Bayes’rule.10

3

Equilibrium analysis

As a benchmark, we …rst consider the setting without signals. For su¢ ciently small " there
is the unique equilibrium in this game. The top …rm, …rm f1 ; makes an o¤er to its best
worker, i.e. worker w1 . The second top …rm, …rm f2 ; anticipates that worker w1 is likely to
accept …rm f1 ’s o¤er. Hence, the optimal strategy of …rm f2 is to make an o¤er to worker
w2 , its favorite worker among Wn fw1 g and so on:
Theorem 1 For any " 2 (0; "),11 there is the unique equilibrium in the game without signals.
Firm fj ; j = 1; :::; F; makes an o¤er to worker wj .
The number of matches in the unique equilibrium in the game without signals is maximal
and equals to F (since W F ). We further refer to this match as “no signaling”match.
Now, we proceed to the analysis of the game with signals. We say a subset of workers
S
Wf
W is reached for …rm f when workers follow strategy pro…le W if …rm f receives
10

As usual in a sequential equilibrium, permissible o¤-equilibrium beliefs are de…ned by considering the
limits of completely mixed strategies.
u(j+1)
)
11
" = min(minj ( u(j) u(j)
); u(Fu(F
)+u(1) ):
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signals from exactly set WfS with positive probability. We also say that …rm f responds to
worker w’s signal, when workers follow strategy pro…le W ; if there exists a subset of workers
W; w 2
= WfS , such that both WfS and WfS [ w are reached for …rm f when workers
WfS
follow strategy pro…le W , and f (WfS ) 6= f (WfS [ w). Intuitively, …rm f responding to
worker w’s signal means that worker w’s signal changes the …rm’s strategy with positive
probability. This happens only if the signal transmits useful information about worker w’s
preferences, and …rm f is ready to take this information into account and act upon it. We
will also use phrase "…rm responds to a worker’s signal in equilibrium" meaning that the
…rm responds to the worker’s signal when the worker follows the equilibrium strategies.
Note that there always exists a babbling equilibrium in which …rms do not respond to
signals. Since …rms do not take into account signals the only possible outcome of any babbling
equilibrium is no signaling match. If …rms respond to signals in equilibrium they make their
o¤ers based on the set of signals they receive. This might change the matching outcome. The
following theorem establishes the existence of such an equilibrium.12 Moreover, it provides
a condition when there exists an equilibrium when at least three …rms responds to some
worker signals. As we will see later in section 4, this property will prove to be very useful.
Theorem 2 Fix any " 2 (0; "): If there are at least three …rms that weakly prefer some
worker wi to their no signaling matches, i.e. j(fj 2 F : wi fj wj )j 3; then there exists
an equilibrium of the game with signals in which at least three …rms respond to worker wi
signals.
We illustrate the above result by way of an example with three …rms and three workers.
For simplicity, we assume that all …rms rank the workers in the same way (w1 ; w2 ; w3 ), i.e.
each …rm strictly prefers worker w1 to worker w2 to worker w3 . Hence, all three …rms weakly
prefer worker w1 to their no signaling matches.
The following set of strategies constitutes an equilibrium of the game with signals with
the property that all three …rms respond to worker w1 ’s signal. Worker w1 sends her signal
to the best …rm according to her realized preference list. Worker w2 (w3 ) always sends her
signal to her no signaling match, i.e. …rm f2 (f3 ). Each …rm makes its o¤er to worker w1
only if it receives a signal from her. If …rm f1 does not receive a signal from worker w1 it
makes its o¤er to worker w2 . If …rm f2 (f3 ) does not receive a signal from worker w1 it makes
an o¤er to worker w2 (w3 ).13
Intuitively, each …rm believes that it is the best …rm in worker w1 preference list only if it
receives a signal from her. Hence, each …rm optimally makes an o¤er to worker w1 only when
12

Standard re…nements (see Cho and Kreps, 1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987) cannot guarantee the uniqueness
of equilibrium in our model. However, there is a unique equilibrium when …rm fi (i = 1; :::; F ) responds to
signals of all workers better or equal to worker wi (see Kushnir, 2010).
13
Beliefs can be obtained using Bayes’rule whenever possible. We assume that …rms o¤-equilibrium beliefs
regarding worker types coincide with their priors. We do not impose any restriction on …rm o¤-equilibrium
beliefs regarding workers’actions.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium behavior
it receives a signal from her. If …rm f1 does not receive worker w1 ’s signal it believes that
worker w1 has sent a signal to her best …rm that will ultimately make her an o¤er. Hence,
…rm f1 can secure a match with worker w2 with probability at least equal 1 ". Similarly,
if …rm f2 (f3 ) does not receive a signal from worker w1 it can secure at best worker w2 (w3 )
with probability at least equal 1 ". Finally, note that all …rms ignore worker w2 and worker
w3 signals. As well, worker w2 and worker w3 signals do not provide any information about
the worker realized preferences.

4

Number of matches

In this section we present a comparison between the game with and without signals in terms
of the expected number of matches.
As we observed above, there is a maximum match in the o¤er game without signals for
su¢ ciently small probability of atypical preferences. Hence, the introduction of a signaling
cannot increase the expected number of matches. The next theorem shows that if there
exists at least three …rms that respond to some worker signals in an equilibrium of the game
with signals, the expected number of matches in this equilibrium is strictly smaller than in
no signaling match.
Theorem 3 If at least three …rms respond to some worker signals in an equilibrium of the
game with signals the expected number of matches in this equilibrium is strictly smaller than
in the unique equilibrium of the game without signals.
To illustrate the theorem, let us consider an example discussed after Theorem 2.
Since A( w ) has the full support the preference pro…le in which …rm f3 is the most
favorite …rm of worker w1 realizes with positive probability. Hence, worker w1 sends a signal
to …rm f3 , and workers w2 and w3 send their signals to …rm f2 and f3 correspondingly.
Firm f3 makes an o¤er to worker w1 , and …rm f1 anticipates that worker w1 is atypical and
makes an o¤er to worker w2 . Firm f2 also makes its o¤er to worker w2 . Hence, …rm f2 will
most likely ends up unmatched (a ”typical" type worker w2 would prefer …rm f1 to …rm f2 ).
8
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Figure 2: Mismatches.
Figure 2 illustrates the above argument. Note that the coordination failure arises because
…rm f2 has no information about worker w1 ’s type and cannot anticipate …rm f1 ’s behavior.
Thus, the number of matches for some realization of preferences is strictly smaller than the
maximum match. Therefore, the expected number of matches in this equilibrium is strictly
smaller than the maximum match.
Note that if only two …rms respond to some worker signals in an equilibrium of the game
with signals, the expected number of matches in this equilibrium might be equal to maximum
match. In such an equilibrium if some …rm fj secures a better match with some atypical
worker wi ; i < j, …rm fi always makes its o¤er to worker wj in an equilibrium. Therefore,
…rms exchange their partners, which does not decrease the number of matches.

5

Welfare

In this section we show that the e¤ect from the introduction of signaling on welfare depends
on the relative magnitudes of …rms’ and workers’ cardinal utilities: The intuition is that
signals play two roles in equilibria when …rms respond to signals. On the one hand, signals
help to secure “better” matches between some atypical workers and …rms, which positively
a¤ects the welfare of agents on both sides of the market. On the other hand, the introduction
of signals leaves some workers and …rms unmatched, which negatively a¤ects the welfare of
agents on both sides of the market.
Example 1 illustrates that the introduction of signals is bene…cial for a matching market
according to egalitarian welfare criterion if and only if the decrease in the number of matches
is o¤set by better matches of atypical workers. A similar calculation shows that the total
welfare of …rms changes ambiguously.
Example 1 Let us consider the example discussed after Theorem 2. In addition, we assume
that preferences of atypical workers are independently uniformly distributed among all possible
preference order lists. Workers’ cardinal utilities from being matched to …rst, second, and
third choice are + ; ; and
( > ) respectively. The expected total welfare of workers

9
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in no signaling match equals
nosignals
E[Wworker
]=

P3

i=1

(1

") u(i) + " 13

P3

l=1

u(l) = 3 :

One may check that the expected total welfare of workers in the equilibrium discussed after
Theorem 2 equals (terms of the order of "2 and "3 are omitted)
signals
E[Wworker
]=3 +

1
3

+2

"

Hence, the expected total welfare of workers increases only if the di¤erence in utilities between
adjacent …rms is large enough, > 16 .

6

Role of signals in matching markets

Coles et al. (2010b) show that the introduction of signals increases the expected number of
matches and the welfare of workers in the model similar to the one discussed in this paper.
The main di¤erence from the current paper is that they consider markets where agents’
preferences are block-correlated. Speci…cally, there exists a partition F1 ; : : : ; FB of the …rms
into blocks and
1. For any b < b0 , where b; b0 2 f1; : : : ; Bg, each worker prefers every …rm in block Fb to
any …rm in block Fb0 ;
2. Each worker’s preferences within block Fb are uniform and uncorrelated, for all b;
3. Firm preferences over workers are uniform and uncorrelated.
We have shown above that the results of Coles et al. (2010b) rely on the assumption
that preferences are block-correlated. If the preferences of workers are almost aligned and
the preferences of …rms are known, there is a perfect match in the market. Trying to
help atypical workers through the introduction of a signaling mechanism we decrease the
expected number of matches and ambiguously a¤ect the welfare of agents. Overall, Table 1
summarizes the e¤ect from the introduction of the signals for the two di¤erent environments:
almost complete (this paper) and block-correlated distribution of preferences.
Preferences
Almost complete
Block-correlated

No signals M atches
0
0

+

E[Wworker ] E[W…rm ]
+

Table 1. Almost complete and block-correlated distribution preferences.
10
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A natural question is why signals in‡uence matching markets in di¤erent ways. We argue
that the signals play two di¤erent roles: transmit information and introduce information
asymmetry. On the one hand, the introduction of signals helps atypical workers to transmit
information about their preferences and locate a better match. On the other hand, signals
transmit information only to some …rms, thus introducing information asymmetry. This
information asymmetry leads to coordination failures that decrease the number of matches.
When there is ex-ante small amount of information about agents’preferences, information transmission plays a more important role in match formation. This happens when
agents’preferences are block-correlated, as in Coles et al. (2010b). However, when there is
almost complete information about agents’preferences as in the model of this paper the
introduction of signals leads to coordination failures. Table 2 presents this comparison.
Preferences

Transmit information Introduce information asymmetry

Almost complete
Block-correlated

Small
Large

Large
Small

Table 2. The roles of signals
Overall, the signals play opposing roles in the match formation process. This could make
signals a less powerful tool than it was previously anticipated.

7

Conclusion

There is a general belief that the introduction of a signaling mechanism should facilitate
match formation in matching markets (see Roth, 2008; AEA, 2005). This belief is also
supported by Coles et al. (2010b) who show that the introduction of signaling increases the
expected number of matches and welfare of workers in the environment in which agents’
preferences distribution is quite disperse. We show in this paper that this belief can be
erroneous for some matching markets.
The main contribution of the current paper is twofold. First, we identify an environment
in which the signaling mechanism that has been implemented in some real-life markets is
actually harmful for matching outcomes. We also identify the exact way how private signals
harm matching outcomes - introduce information asymmetry. Second, we contribute to the
cheap talk literature by providing an environment in which new cheap talk equilibria may be
welfare inferior compared to babbling equilibria. To the best of our knowledge, only Farrell
and Gibbons (1989) have similar results, though their focus di¤ers from ours.
We …nally want to note that the negative signaling e¤ects are robust to several extensions
of our model. Several identical signals will allow transmitting information to more …rms,
11
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however make this information less precise. As long as the number of signals is smaller than
the total number of …rms, signaling still introduce information asymmetry. If agents have
several periods of interaction they will be able to secure better matches. However, if the
number of agents in the market is large compared to the number of interaction periods, as
in real-life markets, the introduction of information asymmetry still leads to mismatches.
One might also think about making signal public, i.e. observable to all …rms. However,
Kushnir (2010) shows that the introduction of public signals still lead to ine¢ ciencies in the
environment of our paper.

A

Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1.
)
u(j+1)
); u(Fu(F
): We show …rm strategies are optimal
Let us consider " = min(minj ( u(j) u(j)
)+u(1)
sequentially. If …rm f1 makes an o¤er to its best worker, w1 ; worker w1 accepts the o¤er with
probability equal at least 1 ". Hence, its expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to worker
w1 equals at least (1 ")u(1) that is greater than u(k); k
2; for any 0 < " < ". Hence,
…rm f1 has a dominant strategy to make an o¤er to w1 .
Let us assume that each …rm fk , k < j; makes its o¤er to worker wk . Now we consider
the incentives of …rm fj . Given …rm fk , k < j; strategies, the expected payo¤ from making
an o¤er to some worker among fw1 ; :::wj 1 g equals at most "u(1). In addition, the expected
payo¤ from making an o¤er to some worker Wnfw1 ; :::wj g equals at most u(j + 1). At the
same time, the expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to worker wj equals at least (1 ")u(j).
Since for any 0 < " < " we have that (1 ")u(j) > "u(1) and (1 ")u(j) > u(j + 1): The
optimal strategy of …rm fj is to make an o¤er to worker wj .
Proof of Theorem 2.
Note that …rm fi 2 (fj 2 F : wi fj wj ) by our convention of the notation on p. 5. We
denote two other …rms from (fj 2 F : wi fj wj ) as fa and fb . It again follows from our
notation on p. 5 that i < a and i < b.
We construct an equilibrium in which …rms ffi ; fa ; fb g respond to worker wi signals. Each
worker w 2 W=fwi g sends her signal randomly independently on her realized preferences.
Worker wi sends her signals to the best …rm among ffi ; fa ; fb g according her preference list.
Each worker accepts her best o¤er on the last stage of the game.
Each …rm ft 2 F=ffi ; fa ; fb g makes its o¤er to the corresponding worker wt independently
on the set of signals it receives. Hence, …rm ft never responds to the signal of any worker.
Firm ft ’s beliefs regarding workers types coincide with its priors independently on the set
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of signals it receives.14 Firm ft believes that each worker from W=fwi g sends her signal
randomly. If …rm ft does not receive a signal from worker wi it believes that worker wi sends
her signal to her best …rm among ffi ; fa ; fb g:15
Firm fi makes an o¤er to worker wi only if it receives a signal from her. Otherwise, …rm
fi makes an o¤er to the best worker among Wnfw1 ; :::; wi g. If …rm fi receives a signal from
worker wi it believes that it is worker wi ’s best …rm among ffi ; fa ; fb g; otherwise, …rm fi
believes that worker wi sends her signal to her best …rm among ffi ; fa ; fb g.
If …rm fa (fb ) receives a signal from worker wi , it makes an o¤er to worker wi . Otherwise,
it makes an o¤er to worker wa (wb ): Firm fa (fb ) beliefs coincide with …rm fi beliefs.
It is immediate to see that the above strategies constitute an equilibrium for " < ". The
proof that the strategies of …rm ft 2 F=ffi ; fa ; fb g are optimal is similar to the proof of
Theorem 1.
Firm fa (fb ) strategy of making an o¤er to worker wi whenever it receives a signal from
her is optimal because …rm fa (fb ) believes that it is the best …rm among ffi ; fa ; fb g and no
other …rm makes an o¤er to her. If …rm fa (fb ) does not receive a signal from worker wi
it can secure an match with probability at least 1 " only with workers Wnfw1 ; :::; wa 1 g
(Wnfw1 ; :::; wb 1 g). Worker wa (wb ) is the best among such workers.
Firm fi strategy of making an o¤er to worker wi whenever it receives a signal from her is
optimal because …rm fa (fb ) believes that it is the best …rm among ffi ; fa ; fb g and no other
…rm makes an o¤er to her. If …rm fi does not receive a signal from worker wi it can secure
an match with probability at least 1 " only with workers Wnfw1 ; :::; wi g.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Let us assume that the expected number of matches equals the full match in the equilibrium of the game with signals when at least three …rms respond to some worker signals. We denote …rms that respond to worker w signals as ffa ; fb ; fc g. Hence for each …rm
f 2 ffa ; fb ; fc g there exists WfS such that w 2
= WfS ; WfS and WfS [ w are reached for …rm f ,
and f (WfS ) 6= f (WfS [ w). Note that either f (WfS ) = w or f (WfS [ w) = w. Otherwise,
some worker would receive either at least two o¤ers, i.e. …rm f and some other …rm o¤er,
or no o¤ers with positive probability. This precludes the possibility of the full match that
we have assumed.
Let us show that the typical type of worker w should send a signal to a …rm that responds
to worker w signals. If the typical type of worker w does not send a signal at all, there should
exists a …rm f that makes w an o¤er without receiving a signal from her with positive
probability (since there is the full match for each realization of preferences). However, …rms
ffa ; fb ; fc g make their o¤ers to worker w with positive probability upon receiving or not
14

Even if …rm ft receives a signal from worker wi (o¤-equilibrium) it believes that each type of worker wi
could make such deviation equally likely.
15
There is no need to specify …rm ft beliefs regarding worker wi actions if …rm ft receives worker wi signal.
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receiving her signal. Hence, worker w should receive two o¤ers with positive probability.
This precludes the possibility of the full match.
Using similar logic we can show that if the typical type of worker w sends a signal to a
…rm that does not respond to her signal, worker w has to receive either two or no o¤ers with
positive probability. This again precludes the possibility of the full match for each realization
of preferences.
Therefore, the typical type of worker w sends her signal to some …rm that responds to
her signal. Let this …rm be fa . We know that …rm fb responds to worker w signals. Assume
S
S
S
S
fb (Wfb [ w) = w and fb (Wfb ) = wb for some Wfb and wb 6= w. The case fb (Wfb [ w) = wb
and fb (WfSb ) = w can be analyzed in the same way.
We can have the full match for each realizations of preferences only if …rm fa makes an
o¤er to worker wb whenever it does not receive a signal from worker w, i.e. …rm fa and fb
exchange their matches.
However, …rm fc also responds to worker w signal. Hence, there exists WfSc such that
w 2
= WfSc ; WfSc and WfSc [ w are reached in the equilibrium, and either fc (WfSc ) = w or
S
f (Wf [ w) = w.
Hence, either worker w receives simultaneously two o¤ers from fc and fa with positive
probability or worker wb receives simultaneously two o¤ers from …rms fa and fb with positive
probability. Either case precludes the possibility of the full match for each realization of
preferences. This contradicts our assumption that the expected number of matches equals
the full match in the equilibrium of the game with signal when at least three …rms respond
to some worker signals.
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